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Abstract
We propose a quantum-like (QL) model of the functioning of the
brain. It should be sharply distinguished from the reductionist quan-
tum model. By the latter cognition is created by physical quantum
processes in the brain. The crucial point of our modelling is that dis-
covery of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics (QM)
was in fact discovery of a very general formalism describing consistent
processing of incomplete information about contexts (physical, men-
tal, economic, social). The brain is an advanced device which devel-
oped the ability to create a QL representation of contexts. Therefore
its functioning can also be described by the mathematical formal-
ism of QM. The possibility of such a description has nothing to do
with composing of the brain of quantum systems (photons, electrons,
protons,...). Moreover, we shall propose a model in that the QL rep-
resentation is based on conventional neurophysiological model of the
functioning of the brain. The brain uses the QL rule (given by von
Neumann trace formula) for calculation of approximative averages for
mental functions, but the physical basis of mental functions is given
by neural networks in the brain. The QL representation has a tempo-
ral basis. Any cognitive process is based on (at least) two time scales:
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subcognitive time scale (which is very fine) and cognitive time scale
(which is essentially coarser).
1 Introduction
We start with formulation of a number of questions which will be consid-
ered in this paper. We shall try to find proper answers to those questions.
From the very beginning we recognize that the present level of experimental
research in quantum physics, neurophysiology, cognitive science, and psy-
chology is not high enough to support (or to reject) our quantum-like (QL)
model of cognition.
Although basic theoretical tools behind our model are mathematics and
physics, we would like to address this paper to really multi-disciplinary au-
ditorium: philosophers, neurophysiologists, psychologists, mathematicians,
physicists, people working in cognitive and social sciences, economy (our
model can be easily generalized from a single brain to a collection of brains),
and even abnormal phenomena. Therefore we practically excluded mathe-
matical technique from this paper. A reader can find corresponding details
in references on author’s papers, e.g., Khrennikov (2005a,b, 2006b–d).
This paper has a detailed introduction which is in principle sufficiently
complete to create a general picture of our QL cognitive model. The last part
of this paper is more complicated. It can be interesting for neurophysiologists
and psychologists, since we couple our QL model with the temporal structure
of processes in the functioning of the brain. A number of time scales will
be discussed as possible candidates for QL and “sub-QL” (vs. cognitive and
subcognitive) time scales.
1.1 Questions and answers
1). Should one distinguish the mathematical formalism of QM from quantum
physics? Yes.
2). Can be this formalism be applied outside physics, e.g. in cognitive
science or sociology? Yes. But corresponding QL models should be tested
experimentally.
3). Can one escape in the QL framework difficulties of existing “really
quantum” models of cognition (based on reduction of cognition to quantum
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physical processes in the brain)? Yes.
4). Can the present neurophysiological model of the functioning of the
brain be combined with a QL model? Yes, see also question 9.
5). Can quantum formalism coexist with hidden variables? It seems
– yes, but the problem is extremely complicated. Further theoretical and
experimental investigations should be performed.
6). Did Bell’s arguments (and corresponding experiments, e.g., Aspect et
al (1982) and Weihs et al (1998), Weihs (2007)) as well as other “NO-GO”
theorems (e.g. von Neumann, Kochen-Specker) really imply that local real-
ism is incompatible with the formalism of QM? Not at all, but the problem is
extremely complicated. Further theoretical and experimental investigations
should be performed.
7). What (Who?) is quantum (QL): the consciousness or the uncon-
sciousness? By our model the consciousness is QL and the unconsciousness
is classical (the latter operates via classical neural networks). We remark
that our viewpoint is opposite to the conventional viewpoint of quantum re-
ductionist approach. By the latter the unconsciousness is quantum and the
consciousness is classical.
8). Are QL cognitive models consistent with ideas of Leibniz, Freud, Niet-
zsche, see also Na¨a¨ta¨nen (1992) for modern neurophysioloical considerations
of this problem, that consciousness is a projection of huge ocean of uncon-
scious information? Yes, by our interpretation the mathematical formalism
of QM describes operation with flows of incomplete information.
9). What is a neural mechanism of the QL conscious representation of
information? We propose a model in that the QL representation is based on
the presence of variety of time scales in processing of mental information in
the brain.
1.2 Short description of quantum-like model of cogni-
tion
UN). Unconsciousness. Each brain operates with huge amounts of uncon-
scious information which is produced via neural activity. Some basic cog-
nitive processes (at low levels of mental organization) are performed in this
unconscious neural representation.
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PR). Projection. The brain projects this unconscious information ocean
on the QL representation. It is a probabilistic representation. Information
about neural activity is represented by a complex probability amplitude, a
mental wave function.
CON). Consciousness. We identify such a QL projection with the con-
scious representation. The consciousness operates with complex probability
amplitudes. Its decision making is based on probabilities and averages de-
scribed by the mathematical formalism of QM.
COM). The brain as QL computer. Hence, the consciousness operates
with algorithms which can be described by the mathematical formalism of
QM. These are so called quantum algorithms. Since the brain realizes them
without appealing to “really quantum physical processes in microworld,” we
can consider it as QL (and not as quantum) computer, cf. Penrose’s model
of the brain as quantum computer.
HV). Hidden mental variables. Our QL model of cognition has hidden
variables – states of neurons. Thus advantages of QL computation, in con-
trast to really quantum computation, are not due to superposition of states
for individual systems (in our case neurons), but due to parallel working of
billions of neurons. The consciousness does not operate in the neural rep-
resentation. It operates in the QL representation. Therefore it proceeds
essentially faster than classical computer1. However, the QL representation
is created by activity of a huge number of neurons working parallel . This is
a purely classical explanation of the process of QL computation.
G). The temporal origin of the QL representation. We suppose that any
conscious QL representation (and the brain can operate with a number of
such representations) is based on two time scales: sub-QL (subcognitive) and
QL (cognitive). Probabilities and averages with respect to classical stochastic
processes for pre-QL time scale are represented in the QL way. Then con-
sciousness operates with such QL probabilistic objects on the QL (cognitive)
time scale.
E). The QL representation of averages is based on approximation of
classical averages by using the Taylor approximation of psychological func-
tions. Operation with approximations (instead of complete classical averages)
tremendously increases the speed of processing of probabilistic information.
1In particular, I completely agree with Penrose’s critique of the famous in 50s-80s
project of artificial intelligence which was an attempt to explain cognition in the framework
of classical computations.
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1.3 On the level of mathematics and physics used in
this paper
We remark that the only mathematical things which will be used in the
last (more technical) part are three formulas, two from probability theory
(one from classical and another from quantum) and third from mathematical
analysis:
a) The classical average (also called mean value or mathematical expec-
tation) of a random variable is given by integral. In the case of a discrete
random variable it is simply a normalized sum.
b) The quantum average is given by the operator-trace in Hilbert space.2
c) Taylor’s formula: any smooth function can be approximated by using
its derivatives (by Taylor’s polynomial).
However, one can proceed rather far (in any event through an extended
introduction) before she will meet mathematics at all. Even in the last
part we escaped long mathematical formulas. There will be used just a few
mathematical symbols.
Regarding quantum physics we only assume that a reader is familiar with
such fundamental problems of quantum foundations as Eistein-Polodosky-
Rosen paradox, completeness/incompleteness of QM, Bell’s inequality, “death
of reality”, quantum nonlocality. One need not know mathematical and phys-
ical details, but just the general picture of 80 years of debates on quantum
foundations.
1.4 Quantum vs. quantum-like cognitive models
The idea that the description of brain functioning, cognition, and conscious-
ness could not be reduced to the theory of neural networks and dynamical
systems (cf. Ashby (1952), Hopfield (1982), Amit (1989), Bechtel and Abra-
hamsen (1991), Strogatz (1994), van Gelder (1995), van Gelder and Port
(1995), Eliasmith (1996)) and that quantum theory may play an important
role in such a description has been discussed in a huge variety of forms, see
e.g. Whitehead (1929, 1933, 1939), Orlov (1982), Healey (1984), Albert and
Loewer (1988, 1992), Lockwood (1989, 1996), Penrose (1989, 1994), Donald
(1990, 1995, 1996), Jibu and Yasue (1992, 1994), Bohm and Hiley (1993),
Stapp (1993), Aerts, D. and Aerts, S. (1995, 2007), Hameroff (1994, 1998),
2In the case of discrete spectrum the operator trace is simply the sum of diagonal
elements of the corresponding matrix.
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Loewer (1996), Hiley and Pylkka¨nen (1997), Deutsch (1997), Barrett (1999),
Khrennikov (1999a, 2000, 2002b, 2003b, 2004a, 2006a), Hiley (2000), Vitiello
(2001), Choustova (2001, 2004), Behera et al (2005), Haven (2006), Conte et
al. (2007), Atmanspacher (2007) and literature thereby.
This idea that QM might have some consequences for cognitive science
and psychology was discussed at many occasions already by fathers of quan-
tum theory. We can mention, for example, attempts of Niels Bohr to apply
the quantum principle of complementarity to psychology (see A. Plotnitsky
2001, 2002, 2007 for discussions). We can also mention the correspondence
between Pauli and Jung about analogy between quantum and mental pro-
cesses.
During the last 30 years it was done a lot for the realization of the very
ambitious program of quantum reductionism. There were various attempts
to reduce mental processes to quantum physical processes in the brain. Here
we point out to fundamental works Hameroff (1994, 1998) and Penrose (1989,
1994, 2005).
However, the quantum formalism provides essentially more possibilities
for modelling of physical, biological, and social processes. One should distin-
guish QM as physical theory and its formalism. In principle, there is nothing
surprising that a formalism which was originally developed for serving for
one special physical theory can be used in other domains of science. For ex-
ample, we are not surprised that differential calculus which was developed to
serve for classical Newtonian mechanics was later used in field theory, QM,
biology, economics. Nobody protests against applying the classical proba-
bility calculus (the Kolmogorov measure-theoretic model) to modelling of
financial processes and so on. In the same way we import the mathemat-
ical formalism of quantum mechanics to cognitive science and psychology,
even without trying to perform a reduction of mental processes to quantum
physical processes.
To escape misunderstanding, we shall reserve notations classical and
quantum for physics. And in applications outside physics we shall use nota-
tions classical-like (CL) and quantum-like (QL).
In this article we shall argue that the functioning of the human brain, in
particular that responsible for and engaging with consciousness, may be QL,
without, as against the arguments advanced by recent quantum theoretical
approaches to consciousness, necessary being physically quantum. Specifi-
cally the QL character of this functioning means that it may be described by
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the same mathematical formalism as that used in QM (say, in von Neumann’s
version of the formalism), even though the physical dynamics underlying this
functioning may not be the same as that of the physical processes considered
in QM (as physical theory). In other words, the article offers a new math-
ematical model of the dynamics of the brain, the model based on the same
mathematics as that used in QM, without viewing this dynamics itself as
physically quantum. In opposite to views of quantum (physical) reduction-
ists of brain’s functioning – e.g. Hameroff (1994, 1998) and Penrose (1989,
1994, 2005), we are not interested in brain’s physical structure on the mi-
cro level. We do not expect to extract cognitive features of the brain from
quantum physical processes.
1.5 On quantum reduction of cognition
By using QL-models we might escape some problems arising in the quan-
tum reductionist approach, e.g., the presence of the huge gap between the
quantum (physical) and neurophysiological scales.
Roughly speaking at the neuronal level the brain is too hot and too noisy
to be able to operate as a physical quantum system. Of course, one could try
to save the quantum reductionist model by rejecting the commonly accepted
neuronal model of the functioning of the brain. One might speculate that
“real mental life” is going on the micro level and that the macro neuronal
activity plays a subsidiary mental role.
Moreover, we could not reject even the hypothetical possibility that “real
mental life” is going on the scales of space and time which are even finer
than those which are coupled to QM (of e.g. electrons, protons or neutrons):
Penrose speculated that consciousness is created on the scales of quantum
gravity.
However, such a revolutionary approach would lead to a number of prob-
lems. First it is not easy to accept that neurons are not at all basic units of
information processing in the brain. Both theoretical and experimental neu-
rophysiology give a huge number of evidences in favor of neural processing
of cognitive information. Then even if neural activity plays a subsidiary role
in cognitive processes comparing with basic quantum activity in the crowed,
the brain could not completely ignore the former. Therefore we should be
able to explain how “quantum cognition” could be lifted from micro world
to the neural level. At the moment such “lifting models” do not exist.
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1.6 Can neuronal and quantum-like models be com-
bined?
As was pointed out the QL approach provides just a special representation of
information which is described by the mathematical apparatus of QM – the
calculus of averages which are calculated not by using classical integration
(summation in the case of discrete random variables), but by taking the
operator trace in Hilbert space.
Therefore information underlying the QL representation can be produced
by micro as well as macro systems. In contrast to “really quantum” reduc-
tionist theories of cognition, a QL model can be based on the QL representa-
tion of (purely classical) information produced by neurons, see Khrennikov
(2002b, 2004a) and Behera et al. (2005).
One can see huge difference between our QL approach and the “really
quantum” approach. By the latter a neuron could not process quantum
information, because it (as a hot and noisy macroscopic system) could not
be being in superposition of two macroscopically distinguishable states: firing
and nonfiring.3 We do not need to consider such “neuronal Schro¨dinger cats.”
In a coming QL model of cognition internal states of neurons are “mental
hidden variables” for the QL representation.
1.7 Conflict with the Copenhagen interpretation of quan-
tum mechanics
Of course, any reader who is little bit aware about 80 years of debates on
the problem of so called completeness of QM immediately understands that
we would be in trouble: the majority of the modern quantum community
believes that QM is complete. It seems that hidden variables and in particular
mental hidden variables could not be introduced (even in principle).
The discussion on completeness of QM was initiated by the famous paper
of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935). In fact, Albert Einstein was strongly
against the so called Copengahen interpretation of QM. Such a rejection of
one special interpretation of QM is often misinterpreted as rejection of QM
by itself. Of course, Einstein was not against QM. However, he considered
QM as only an approximative description of physical processes in the micro
3Penrose (1994): “It is hard to see how one could usefully consider a quantum super-
position consisting of one neuron firing, and simultaneously nonfiring.”
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world. In particular, he was sure that one will create (sooner or later) a more
fundamental theory which would explain so called “quantum randomness” in
terms of classical stochastic processes.
By the Copenhagen interpretation quantum randomness differs crucially
from classical randomness. The latter is reducible to statistical variation of
features of elements of a huge ensemble of systems under consideration. The
former is fundamentally irreducible. It is “individual randomness” of e.g.
electron of photon.
Einstein was sure that quantum randomness can be reduced to classical
one. In particular, the wave function should be associated not with a single
quantum system, but with an ensemble of equally prepared quantum sys-
tems. This is so called Einsteinian or ensemble interpretation of QM. Thus
for Einstein it was totally meaningless to speak about “the wave function of
electron” or about “collapse of such a wave function”. We remind that in
the late 20s and early 30s Schro¨dinger was very sympathetic to the ensemble
interpretation, see his correspondence with Einstein in Schro¨dinger (1982).4
However, finally Scro¨dinger was about to reject not only the Copenhagen, but
also the ensemble interpretation, since Einstein was not able to explain why
probabilistic formalisms of classical and quantum physics differ so much: on
the one hand, the integral calculus and, on the other hand, the operator alge-
bra. This important problem of coupling of the quantum probability calculus
with the classical probability calculus was solved in Khrennikov (2005a,b).
1.8 Bell’s inequality
In spite of many years of debates, there is still no definite answer to the ques-
tion which was asked in Einstein et al (1935). Although arguments based
on Bell’s inequality, see e.g. Bell (1964, 1987) and Clauser et al (1982), and
subsequent experimental studies, see Aspect et al (1982) and Weihs et al
(1998), Weihs (2007), induced rather common opinion that if QM were in-
complete (i.e., a deeper “hidden variable” description is possible), then any
subquantum classical statistical model is nonlocal. Thus one could choose
between “death of reality” (impossibility to introduce hidden variables) and
nonlocality. It is interesting that not so many quantum physicist are ready
to accept a classical nonlocal model of e.g. Bohmian type as a subquantum
4It may be not so well known that even the example with Schro¨dinger’s cat was created
under the influence of Einstein to show absurdness of the Copenhagen interpretation.
Originally Einstein considered bomb.
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model. Although the “official conclusion” from Bell’s arguments is incom-
patibility of QM and local realism, in reality it is completeness of QM (i.e.,
impossibility of a deeper “subquantum” description of micro phenomena)
that is questioned.5
At the first sight such a problem as “death of reality” might be inter-
esting only for philosophers. However, last 10 years quantum information
was intensively developed. And nowadays purely philosophic problems of
quantum foundations play an important role in nanotechnological projects
for billions of dollars. Take quantum cryptography as an example. Definitely
completeness and not contradiction between local realism and QM plays the
crucial role in justification of projects in quantum cryptography. Postulated
incredibly security of quantum cryptography is based on the impossibility
for Eva to create a classical probabilistic model with hidden variables un-
derlying quantum communication between Alice and Bob. If such a model
were possible, Eva would enjoy reading of quantum communications between
Alice and Bob. As was pointed out, people ignore the possibility of classical,
but nonlocal attacks on quantum cryptographic schemes.
1.9 Can a mathematical theorem be used as a crucial
physical argument?
In spite of the evident fact that the majority believes in Bell’s arguments, a
number of experts actively criticise these arguments, see e.g. Pearle (1970),
Accardi and Fedullo (1982), Pitowsky (1982), Fine (1982), De Baere (1984),
Gisin, N. and Gisin, B. (1999), Klyshko (1993a,b, 1995, 1996a,b, 1998a,b),
Larsson (2000), Hess and Philipp (2001, 2002, 2006), Volovich (2001), Khren-
nikov (1999b), Khrennikov and Volovich (2005), Adenier and Khrennikov
(2006), Accardi and Khrennikov (2007). We are not able to discuss those
anti-Bell arguments in this paper. We just point out that Bell’s inequality as
any mathematical theorem is based on a number of mathematical assump-
tions. Some assumptions can be questioned either from mathematical or
physical viewpoints.6
5We remark that this conclusion totally contradicts to the initial plan of J. Bell to show
that QM is incomplete, but subquantum classical reality is nonlocal. One of my colleagues
and a former student of David Bohm pointed out at many occasions to the real abuse of
original Bell’s arguments in modern quantum physics.
6For example, Bell assumed that ranges of values of classical “subquantum variables”
coincide with ranges of values of corresponding quantum observables (for example, the
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Personally I am very surprised that serious people hope that it might be
possible to prove something about physical reality on the basis of a mathe-
matical theorem.7
Can one say that non-Euclidean geometries do not exist in nature, because
Pythagorean theorem is mathematically rigorous? Of course, one could also
check that geometry of space is Euclidean by measurements of angles in
triangles. Suppose that measurements show that geometry is Euclidean. But
for what scale? Can one exclude that that geometry might be non-Euclidean
at a finer scale?
Finally, suppose that measurement devices work so badly that about
80% of triangles are simply destroyed. One should base her conclusions only
on a sub-sample containing 20% of triangles. Moreover, one could not even
exclude that sampling is unfair, i.e., that the measurement devices just select
Euclidean triangles and destroy non-Euclidean, cf. QM – violation of Bell’s
inequality: Pearle (1970), Gisin, N. and Gisin, B. (1999), Larsson (2000),
Adenier and Khrennikov (2006).
1.10 Quantum-like processing of incomplete informa-
tion
We decide not to wait for the end of the exciting Einstein-Bohr debate and
the complete clarification of the theoretical and experimental situation for the
EPR experiment and Bell’s inequality. We proceed already now by creating
a QL model in that the mathematical structure of QM is reproduced. Such
a model is based on an incomplete representation of classical information.
What are advantages of the incomplete-information interpretation of the
mathematical formalism of QM?
In such an approach the essence of the quantum mathematical formal-
ism is not the description of a special class of physical systems, so called
quantum systems, having rather exotic and even mystical properties, but the
classical spin variable should take the same values as the quantum spin observable, i.e.,
±1). If we proceed without this assumption (so we consider a more complicated picture of
correspondence between classical and quantum models) then we can reproduce quantum
correlations as classical ensemble correlations, see Accardi and Khrennikov (2007).
7I recall that Einstein completely ignored the first known “NO-GO” theorem which
was proved by von Neumann in early 30s. It is especially curious, since von Neumann’s
book, see e.g. von Neumann (1955), was being in Einstein’s office during many years.
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possibility to operate with incomplete information about contexts.8 Thus
one can apply the formalism of QM in any situation which can be character-
ized by the incomplete description of contexts (physical, biological, mental).
This (mathematical) formalism could be used in any domain of science, cf.
Aerts, D. and Aerts, S. (1995, 2007), Khrennikov (1999a, 2000, 2002b, 2003b,
2004a, 2006a), Choustova (2001, 2004), Haven (2006), Busemeyer et al (2006,
2007 a,b), Franco (2007): in cognitive and social sciences, economy, informa-
tion theory. Contexts under consideration need not be exotic. However, the
complete description of them should be not available or ignored (by some
reasons).
We shall use the incomplete-information interpretation of the formalism
of QM. By our interpretation it is a special mathematical formalism working
in the absence of complete information about context. By using this for-
malism a cognitive system permanently ignores huge amount of information.
However, such an information processing does not induce chaos. It is ex-
tremely consistent. Thus the QL information cut off is done in a clever way.
This is the main advantage of the QL processing of information.
Suppose that a biological organism is not able to collect or/and to pro-
cess the complete set of information about some context: either because of
some restrictions for observations or because it is in hurry – to decide imme-
diately or to die! Such an organism can create a model of phenomena which
is based on permanent and consistent ignorance of a part of information.
Evolution can take a large number of generations. Consistency of ignorance
plays the crucial role. Organisms in a population should elaborate the same
system of rules for ignorance of information, otherwise they would not be
able to communicate. By our interpretation the QL formalism provides the
consistent rules for such a modelling of reality. We assume that higher level
biological organisms and especially human beings developed in the process
of evolution the ability of QL processing of information. Thus QL processing
is incorporated in our brains.
By our approach cognitive evolution of biological systems can be con-
sidered as evolution from purely classical cognition (neural processing of
complete data) to QL cognition. From this viewpoint human beings are
essentially more quantum than e.g. dogs and dogs than crocodiles. Essential
number of algorithms which are performed by the human brain are QL (of
course, classical algorithms and networks also play essential roles). One might
8In principle, context may be represented by an ensemble of systems, but may be not.
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speculate that crocodiles operate merely with classical algorithms. Reading
of e. g. Fabre (2006) gives the strong impression that insects’ activity has
no QL-elements.
1.11 Time scales of the functioning of brain and QL
model
By our model, see section 4.2, the QL brain works on two time scales: subcog-
nitive (pre-QL) and cognitive (QL). At the first (fine) time scale information
process is described by classical stochastic dynamics which is transformed
into QL stochastic dynamics at the second (rough) time scale.
To couple our model to physiology, behavioral science, and psychology,
we consider a number of known fundamental time scales in the brain. Al-
though the elaboration of those scales was based on advanced experimental
research, there are still many controversial approaches and results. The tem-
poral structure of the brain functioning is very complex. As the physiological
and psychological experimental basis of our QL-model we chosen results of in-
vestigations on one special quantal temporal model of mental processes in the
brain, namely, Taxonomic Quantum Model –TQM, see Geissler et al (1978),
Geissler and Puffe (1982), Geissler (1983, 85, 87,92), Geissler and Kompass
(1999, 2001), Geissler, Schebera, and Kompass (1999). The TQM is closely
related with various experimental studies on the temporal structure of men-
tal processes, see also Klix and van der Meer (1978), Kristofferson (1972,
80, 90), Bredenkamp (1993), Teghtsoonian (1971). We also couple our QL-
model with well known experimental studies, see, e.g., Brazier (1970), which
demonstrated that there are well established time scales corresponding to the
alpha, beta, gamma, delta, and theta waves; especially important for us are
results of Aftanas and Golosheykin (2005), Buzsaki (2005).
The presence of fine scale structure of firing patterns which was found
in Luczak et al (2007) in experiments which demonstrated self-activation of
neuronal patterns in the brain is extremely supporting for our QL-model.9
9”Even in the absence of sensory stimulation, cortex shows complex spontaneous activ-
ity patterns, often consisting of alternating ”DOWN” states of generalized neural silence
and ”UP” states of massive, persistent network activity. To investigate how this sponta-
neous activity propagates through neuronal assemblies in vivo, we recorded simultaneously
from populations of 50-200 cells in neocortical layer V of anesthetized and awake rats. Each
neuron displayed a virtually unique spike pattern during UP states, with diversity seen
among both putative pyramidal cells and interneurons, reflecting a complex but stereo-
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Of course, not yet everything is clear in neurophysiological experimental re-
search, see Luczak et al (2007): ”The way spontaneous activity propagates
through cortical populations is currently unclear: while in vivo optical imag-
ing results suggest a random and unstructured process Kerr et al (2005), in
vitro models suggest a more complex picture involving local sequential orga-
nization and/or travelling waves, Cossart et al (2003), Mao (2001), Ikegaya
(2004), Sanchez-Vives and McCormick (2000), Shu, Hasenstaub, and Mc-
Cormick(2003), MacLean (2005).”
In any event our QL-model for brain functioning operates on time scales
which are used in neurophysiology, psychology and behavioral science. This
provides an interesting opportunity to connect the mathematical formalism
of QM with theoretical and experimental research in mentioned domains of
biology. We hope that our approach could attract the attention of neurophys-
iologists, psychologists and people working in behavioral science to quantum
modelling of the brain functioning. On the other hand, our QL-model might
stimulate theoretical and experimental research on temporal structures of
the brain functioning.
2 QL averages as the basis of advanced cog-
nition
2.1 Classical neural averages as cognitive images
We consider the following model of the functioning of the brain. Brain’s
state x is combined of states of individual neurons. Any mental function
f is realized as a function of the state: f(x). We consider x as classical
random vector (so mathematician would write x = x(ω), where ω is a random
parameter) describing fluctuations of neural activity.10 By our model the
brain does not “feel” fluctuations of the mental function f(x) induced by
fluctuations of the neural state x. Brain’s images are purely statistical. The
brain “feels” the average 〈f〉 of the mental function. Distributions of neural
typically organized sequential spread of activation through local cortical networks. The
timescale of this spread was 100ms, with spike timing precision decaying as UP states
progressed,” see Luczak et al (2007).
10In a more advanced model the brain is split in a number of networks and each network
determines its own state-variable. Different mental functions are associated with different
networks.
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activity produce probabilistic cognitive images.
This is a purely classical probabilistic model of cognition, see Khrennikov
(2004a,b) and for its neural realization. Of course, to elaborate it one should
discover “statistical neural code”: to make correspondence between averages
of a mental function and cognitive images corresponding to this functions.
One could not exclude the possibility that different mental functions may
have different coding systems. This is a problem of the greatest complexity,
cf. problem of neural code.
However, we do not claim that an advanced brain works on the basis of
such a classical statistical cognition. The main problem is the huge dimension
of the neural-state vector (at least for advanced mental functions). To find
the statistical average 〈f〉, the brain should perform integration over the
space having the dimension of a few billions. It is clear that it is totally
impossible to proceed in this way.
2.2 Production of QL averages-images
If cognitive systems really use statistical encoding of images they should find
some approximative representation of averages. We shall see that one of
simplest approximations of the classical average coincides with the quantum
average. The latter is given by the operator-trace formula, see von Neumann
(1955).
By our approach the QL approximation was developed by cognitive sys-
tems to speed the process of calculation of averages with respect to fluctua-
tions of neural activity.
2.3 Quantum-like processing of information as a char-
acteristic feature of advanced brains
If the brain does not have so many neurons and neural networks it can proceed
purely classically. It can use the probabilistic representation of information
which is given by classical averages: normalized sums of values of a mental
function f. Therefore QL cognitive processing of information is profitable
only for “advanced brains.” As was pointed out in introduction, primitive
cognitive systems need not process information by using QL algorithms, be-
cause they need not even represent information in the QL way. It is clear that
QL evolution of biological organisms should produce a smooth scale of the
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QL ability for information processing. In the processes of evolution brains
became more complicated on the neural level. To speed information pro-
cessing, brains should look for some approximative representation. In this
way they develop the QL ability. However, they still preserve a number of
mental functions which are based on classical probabilistic algorithms. In
particular, in the human brain classical mental functions peacefully coexist
with QL mental functions (which were created at the latter stage of cognitive
evolution).11
At some moment in the process of cognitive evolution the crucial step
toward QL computing was done. Thus our QL cognitive model induces an
interesting problem of cognitive evolution:
“What was the first biological organism with QL information processing?”
Since our QL model has not yet been sufficiently elaborated (neither
theoretically nor experimentally), it is too early to try to give a definite
answer to this question. We shall speculate little bit. It seems that insects
are purely classical, see again e.g. Fabre (2006), as well fishes. What is about
mammals, e.g. dolphin? The brain of dolphin is very advanced as a neural
system. However, it may still be, although very advanced, purely classically
designed. My conjecture is that the crucial step toward QL processing of
cognitive information was done by human beings. And this “QL discovery”
is the main reason for rather special cognitive evolution of human beings.
Shortly, evolution of the brain can be characterized by three stages:
1) deterministic neural network processing – images are states of single
neurons;
2) probabilistic processing – not individual states of neurons, but their
probability distributions determine cognitive images;
3) discovery and development of the QL representation.
At the first stage, the brain was fine with a relatively small number of
neurons. At the second stage the brain was interested to expand as much as
possible (more neurons, more neural networks) – by a very simple reason: a
larger number of probability distributions can be realized on a larger state
11One should not think that all classically realized mental functions are “old” and only
QL realized mental functions are “new” (relatively). If a mental function f need not so
much neural resources (its state space is rather small), then there are no reason to realize
f by using the QL representation. Thus even “new” but simple mental function can have
the classical realization.
16
space. Hence such a classically more complicated brain is able to create
more cognitive images. However, richness of the cognitive representation
was approached by the cost of calculation of averages over spaces of huge
dimension. Discovery of the QL representation solved this computational
problem. Now cognitive images are processed essentially faster than classical
cognitive images.
The QL brain does not demand so much computational resources as it was
at the pre-QL stage of development. Moreover, QL images are less detailed
than the classical ones. We recall that QL representation is an approxi-
mative representation. Thus some “details of the classical representation”
disappear in the process of transition to the QL representation. We shall see
in section 3 that different classical probability distributions of neural activ-
ity can be mapped into the same QL probability distribution. In contrast
to the classical (probabilistic) brain, the QL brain need not be extremely
precise in determining of probabilistic distributions for neural activity. Such
unsharpness of cognitive images also implied liberation of computational re-
sources. Moreover, the QL advanced brain can proceed with a smaller neural
state space. It can reduce the number of neurons comparing with the second
stage of brain’s evolution. The advanced QL brain can be smaller than the
advanced classical (probabilistic) brain.
The homo-brains really evolved in this way: the brain of homo was 10%
greater than the modern human average. By our model homo neanderthalen-
sis was the highest stage of extensional development based on the classical
probabilistic model. Of course, we can not exclude that such a brain already
had some elements of the QL representation. However, homo sapiens devel-
oped quicker in the QL way. Therefore homo sapiens was able to proceed
better with a smaller brain. Our QL model might explain the evolutionary
superiority of homo sapiens comparing with homo neanderthalensis. Oth-
erwise it is not easy to explain extinction of the latter who was physically
stronger and who had more extended neural state space.
3 The basic mathematical formula for the QL
approximation of classical averages
This is the only section in our paper in that we really can not escape some
mathematics.
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3.1 Covariance matrix
We consider the average of the random vector x. If this vector has co-
ordinates x = (x1, ..., xN) then its average is the vector with coordinates
mx = (mx1 , ..., mxN ), where mxi = Exi is the average of the coordinate xi.
We recall that the covariance matrix of a random vector is defined as the
matrix which elements are covariances between coordinates of this random
vector.
ρ = (ρij), ρij = E(xi −mxi)(xj −mxj ).
We recall that any covariance matrix is symmetric: ρij = ρji and it is posi-
tively defined:
(ρx, x) =
∑
ij
ρijxixj ≥ 0.
We also remark that its trace
Trρ = ρ11 + ... + ρNN
is equal to dispersion of the random vector x : Dx = σ2x, where σx is so called
standard quadratic deviation of x.
3.2 Taylor formula
Let f(x) be a smooth function. We recall that (in the multidimensional case)
its derivative at some fixed point a = (a1, ..., aN) is given by its gradient
consisting of the derivatives with respect to coordinates (partial derivatives)
f ′(a) =
( ∂f
∂x1
(a), ...,
∂f
∂xN
(a)
)
.
The right geometric interpretation of the gradient is that it is a so called
covector. There is well defined pairing with vectors:
(f ′(a), x) =
∂f
∂x1
(a) x1 + ... +
∂f
∂xN
(a) xN .
The second derivative is given by the matrix of partial derivatives of the
second order which is called Hessian:
f ′′(a) =
( ∂2f
∂xi∂xj
(a)
)
.
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We point out that this matrix is symmetric.
By using the Taylor formula of the second order in the point a we get:
f(x) ≈ f(a) + (f ′(a), x− a) +
1
2
(f ′′(a)(x− a), (x− a)). (1)
If we now take the average of both parts of this approximative equality by
choosing a = mx we obtain:
〈f〉 ≡ Ef(x) ≈ f(mx) +
1
2
E(f ′′(mx)(x−mx), (x−mx)). (2)
The term with the first derivative disappeared, because E(x−mx) = 0 (the
operation of averaging is linear). Thus only the second derivative is important
for such a probabilistic approximation. By using little bit of linear algebra
we can represent the last term as the matrix-trace: Tr ρ A, where the matrix
A = 1
2
f ′′(mx) and ρ is the covariance matrix of the random vector x.
3.3 Normalization of random variable
In probability theory it is convenient to operate with normalized random
variables. We set
y =
x−mx
σx
Then its average is equal 0 and dispersion is equal 1. In particular, for its
covariance matrix the trace is equal 1.
We now consider this normalization of the random state-vector in the
approximation formula (2). By assuming that a mental function is chosen in
such a way that f(0) = 0 (if it was not so from the very beginning, we just
set f(x)→ f(x)− f(0)) we get the following simple approximation formula:
〈f〉 ≈ Tr ρ A, (3)
where A = 1
2
f ′′(0).
19
3.4 Quantum averaging
The quantum averaging procedure is based on linear algebra.12 To simplify
considerations, we discuss QM with finite-dimensional state space. Such a
quantum model is basic for e.g. quantum information: one qubit has the two
dimensional state space, N qubits have the 2N dimensional state space.
Quantum observables are given by symmetric matrices. Quantum states
are given by von Neumann density matrices13: symmetric, positively defined
and having the unit trace.
The quantum average of an observable A with respect to a state ρ is given
by the von Neumann trace formula:
〈A〉 = Tr ρ A, (4)
3.5 Wave function or density matrix?
Historically quantum states are associated with wave functions. These are so
called pure states. So called mixed states are given by von Neumann density
matrices. First we remark that any pure state ψ also can be represented
by a density matrix, namely, by the orthogonal projector ρψ onto the vector
ψ. Thus formally one can proceed by using only density matrices. However,
the use of pure states has a deep interpretational basis. By the Copenhagen
interpretation ψ describes the state of an individual quantum system. For ex-
ample, one speaks about the wave function of electron. On the other hand, by
the ensemble interpretation there is no meaning to distinguish “pure states”
and “mixed states.” The ψ-function (in fact, the corresponding projector)
as well as an arbitrary density matrix ρ describes an ensemble of specially
prepared systems. Thus ρψ describes a mixture as well. Of course, this is a
mixture with respect to hidden variables. By the Copenhagen interpretation
such variables do not exist at all.14
12In fact, from the mathematical viewpoint it is even simpler than the classical averaging
procedure. The latter is heavily based on theory of Lebesgue integration which is not so
simple. The common opinion that quantum probability is more complicated than classical
probability is not a consequence of the use of more advanced mathematics, but of counter-
intuitiveness of quantum probability.
13We remind that Landau introduced them even earlier than von Neumann.
14At the last Va¨xjo¨ conference, “Quantum Theory: Reconsideration of Foundations – 4”
Arcady Plotnitsky pointed out that the Copenhagen interpretation should not be directly
identified with Bohr’s interpretation. In fact, Bohr discussed only measurements and not
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Since we follow the ensemble interpretation, we would not speak about
“the wave function of the brain” (hence, for us “collapse of brain’s wave
function” is totally meaningless phrase). Instead of this, we shall consider
QL states of brain given by density matrices. As we shall see, such mental
states arise as special representations of classical neural statistical states.
This is just the question of simplicity. For the brain it is easier to oper-
ate with QL mental states (density matrices) than with classical probability
distributions of neural activity.
3.6 Quantum-like approximation of classical averages
If we compare the formulas (3) and (4) we see that quantum averaging coin-
cides with the approximation of classical averages which was obtained with
the aid of the Taylor formula. We suppose that the brain uses the QL repre-
sentation in this way. It proceeds with quantum averages, because it is sim-
pler to calculate them. But it does not completely lose the “neural ground”,
because it uses approximations of real neural averages.
Thus in the QL representation the probability distribution of neural ac-
tivity is represented by its covariance operator (we recall that we operate
with normalized random state vector). The mental function f is represented
by its second derivative (Hessian).
The QL representation is extremely incomplete. A huge class of probabil-
ity distributions is mapped onto the same “covariance-density matrix” ρ. In
our model abstract cognitive images are created due to the QL representa-
tion by identification of a class of classical probability distributions of neural
activity.
the possibility to introduce hypothetical hidden variables. For him QM was complete
from the experimental viewpoint. It was impossible to perform “better measurements”
than those described by QM. The more orthodox interpretation that even in principle it
is impossible to assume existence of a deeper level of the description of nature was elab-
orated by Fock (“the Leningrad version of the Copenhagen interpretation”). In cognitive
modelling such a difference in the interpretations plays the crucial role. If mental hidden
variables can exist, then they even can be measured. Bohr might be not strongly against
this possibility, because mental hidden variables are macroscopic.
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4 Precision of quantum-like approximation of
classical averages
4.1 Mental and neural realities
One can ask: “What is the precision of the QL approximation, see (3), of
classical averages?” This is not simply a mathematical problem of the preci-
sion of some approximation algorithm. This problem plays the fundamental
role in our QL cognitive modelling.
If approximation is very good, then the QL approximation (given by
the von Neumann trace formula) does not differ so much from the “real
average” corresponding to neural activity. In such a case the use of the QL
representation just make faster operation with averages-images (because it
is easier to calculate trace than the Lebesgue integral). However, the QL
representation would not deform essentially the classical (neural) picture of
reality.
If the Taylor approximation is rather rough, then the QL approximation
differs essentially from the “real average.” In such a case the use of the QL
representation not only make faster operation with averages-images, but it
also deforms essentially the classical (neural) picture of reality. The brain
created new QL “mental reality” which does not have direct relation to neu-
ral reality (although “mental reality” is still not independent from neural
reality).
4.2 Time scales and the precision of the quantum-like
approximation
In Khrennikov (2006d) it was shown that one can couple the precision of
the QL approximation with time scales of classical neural processing (sub-
cognitive) and QL processing (cognitive). We would not like to use too
much mathematics in this paper which is oriented to a multi-disciplinary
auditorium. Therefore we just recall the main idea of Khrennikov (2006d)
considerations.
We start with the basic stochastic process x(s, ω) (where s is the sub-
cognitive time and ω is the chance variable) generated by neural activity.
This process proceeds on its own time scale. We call it subcognitive (or sub-
QL) time scale: spcogn. Classical neural averages are created as the result of
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fluctuations at this time scale.
Cognition is “not interested” in individual fluctuations which take place at
this time scale. It is not interested in corresponding fluctuations of a mental
function: f = f(x(s, ω)). It is interested only in the average of the mental
function and, moreover, QL cognition uses only the QL approximation of
the average. Therefore cognition has its own time scale, cognitive time scale
(or QL-scale): tcogn. The interval spcogn is small with respect to the cognitive
time scale (it is an “instant of time” in the cognitive scale). Thus cognitive
images-averages are processed on the cognitive time scale – tcogn and neural
images on the subcognitive time scale spcogn.
Under some assumptions on the underlying neural stochastic process (e.g.
for the process of Brownian motion or more general Gaussian processes) we
can prove that the QL approximation (the trace) deviates from the real
average (integral) by the term of the order κ, where the latter parameter
determines the relative size of the subcognitive and cognitive scales:
κ =
spcogn
tcogn
. (5)
It provides a numerical measure of deviation of the QL (fuzzy, unsharp)
representation of information from the CL (complete, sharp) representation.
Under the assumption that the subcognitive time scale spcogn is fixed, we
find that for small periods of fluctuations tcogn the parameter κ is very large.
Thus higher frequencies (at the cognitive time scale) induce larger deviations
from the (complete) CL-processing of information. Huge amounts of infor-
mation which are processed at the subcognitive time scale are neglected, but
not arbitrary (randomly). There is the QL-consistency in the information
processing.
Consequently, for low frequencies (oscillations with long periods) this co-
efficient is small. Therefore the QL-processing does not imply large deviations
from the CL-computational regime.
One of the fundamental consequences of our QL model for neurophysiol-
ogy and cognitive science is that
Conscious (QL) processing of mental information is associated with rela-
tively high frequencies.15
15In this context “relatively” is with respect to a subcognitive scale. Thus the crucial
role is played not by absolute values of frequencies, but by the gap between sub-QL and
QL time scales.
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The crucial problem is to find those biological time scales which induce
the QL-representation of information. We split the problem into the two
parts:
1) to find the subcognitive time scale;
2) to find the cognitive time scale.
And in reality the problem is even more complicated. Our fundamental
assumption is that there exist various pairs of scales inducing various QL-
representations of information. We could not hope to find once and for ever
defined pair of time scales. Various mental functions can be based on various
pairs of subcognitive and cognitive time scales.
4.3 Cognitive time scale: neurophysiological and cog-
nitive data
It seems that (as in physics, see section 6) the first problem is more com-
plicated. First we consider the second one. We start the discussion on the
choice of the cognitive time scale by considering experimental evidences, that
a moment in psychological time correlates with ≈ 100 msec of physical time
for neural activity. In such a model the basic assumption is that the physical
time required for the transmission of information over synapses is somehow
neglected in the psychological time. The time (≈ 100 msec) required for the
transmission of information from retina to the inferiotemporal cortex (IT)
through the primary visual cortex (V1) is mapped to a moment of psycho-
logical time. It might be that by using tcogn = 100 msec,we shall get the right
cognitive time scale.
However, the situation is not so simple even for the second problem. There
are experimental evidences that the temporal structure of neural functioning
is not homogeneous. The time required for completion of color information in
V4 (≈ 60 msec) is shorter that the time for the completion of shape analysis
in IT (≈ 100 msec). In particular it is predicted that there will be under
certain conditions a rivalry between color and form perception. This rivalry
in time is one of manifestations of complex level temporal structure of brain.
Many cognitive architecture models, e.g., John Anderson’s ACT-R model,
Anderson (2007), assume that each computation step (production rule firing)
takes ≈ 50 msec. This accounts for data well. It might be that by using
tcogn ≈ 50− 100 msec
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we shall get the right scale of the QL-coding.
5 Quantum-like and classical-like regimes of
brain’s functioning
As was already mentioned, if the scaling parameter κ is very small the brain
does not lose too much classical information. This is practically the CL-
computation. But if κ is rather large, then the brain works in a nonclassical
regime. One may say (cf. Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936)) that in such a
regime the brain uses nonclassical logic. However, in our approach the brain
“produces QL logic” on the basis of purely classical (Boolean) logic of neural
processing.
In such a QL process huge amounts of information are permanently ne-
glected. But this does not generate a kind of chaos. Information is neglected
in the consistent QL way.
As was pointed out a few times, such a QL-processing of information
save a lot of computational resources. It might be an important factor of the
natural selection of biological organisms.
6 Quantum and subquantum physical models
We now come back to physics (which was the starting point of our QL mod-
elling). Here we can proceed in the same way and consider two time scales,
Khrennikov (2006d). One scale, we call it subquantum, is a fine time scale,
another, we call it quantum, is a coarser time scale. Oscillations at the
subquantum time scale are averaged. However, the conventional QM is not
about such subquantum classical averages. It is a calculus of approximative
averages given by (3). Such an approximation works well at the quantum
time scale. The latter time scale is considered as an observational time scale.
The scale of observations in modern laboratories. Therefore it is natural to
choose it as the atom time scale:
tq ≈ 10
−21 sec.
The problem of the choice of a subquantum scale is more complicated. One
of possible choices of a subquantum time scale is the Planck time scale:
ssubq ≈ 10
−44 sec.
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We remark that for such a choice of time scales the scaling parameter
κ ≈ 10−23
is negligibly small. On the one hand, such a good approximation explains
the huge predictive power of QM. On the other hand, it makes practically
impossible experimental tests which would show the deviation of the QM-
predictions from the predictions of the subquantum model: namely, the de-
viation of the trace average given by the QM formalism from the real average
obtained on the basis of experimental data.
Thus if the above choice of the time scales was done properly, then our
model has only theoretical value for physics. However, in cognitive science
the gap between scales is not so huge. Therefore we can expect visible effects
of QL behavior.
7 Variety of time scales in brain and quantum-
like cognitive representations
The main lesson from the experimental and theoretical investigations on
the temporal structure of processes in brain is that there are various time
scales. They correspond to (or least they are coupled with) various aspects
of cognition. Therefore we are not able to determine once and for ever the
cognitive time scale tcogn (“psychological time”). There are few such scales.
We shall discuss some evident possibilities.
7.1 On variety of quantum and subquantum time scales
in physics
Before to go deeper in the temporal structure of mental processes, we shall
analyze in more detail the multi-scale temporal aspects of QM. Such aspects
have never been discussed. On the one hand, it was commonly assumed
that QM is complete (this is the Copenhagen interpretation). On the other
hand, the quantum formalism is used by only one class of observers – human
beings who discovered the mathematical formalism of QM for one special
observational (quantum) time scale.
However, we can consider a possibility that there exits a class of observers
(”super-clocks civilization”) which use a time scale t′q which is essentially finer
26
than our time scale tq :
t′q << tq.
Thus such a civilization approached another time scale in its laboratories
which is essentially better than atomic time scale.
Suppose that the super-clocks civilization has also created QM – a special
probabilistic representation of information about measurements. Of course,
its time scale should not be extremely fine comparing with the subquantum
time scale ssubq :
ssubq << t
′
q
(we assume that both civilizations – our and super-clocks – are interested in
processes at the same subquantum time scale). The super-clocks civilization
would discover the same mathematical formalism of QM. But the presence
of deviation from subquantum reality would be more evident with respect
to their time scale (since ssubq is the same, but t
′
q is smaller than tq, the
coefficient κ′ for the super-clocks civilization is larger than the coefficient κ
for our civilization).
On the one hand, the super-clocks civilization has a better possibility
to find deviations of the incomplete quantum description from the complete
classical . However, there might be chosen a strategy to ignore such devia-
tions and still use the quantum picture of the world. Even if it does not match
precisely with the complete set of information about external world, it might
be, nevertheless, convenient (by computational and consistency reasons) to
proceed with the quantum pictures of reality.
7.2 Temporal structure of the brain
By our QL model a similar functioning with a few time scales is present in
the brain. How can we find those scales?
It is well known, see, e.g., Brazier (1970), that there are well established
time scales corresponding to the alpha, beta, gamma, delta, and theta waves.
Let us consider these time scales as different cognitive scales. There is one
technical deviation from the QL-scheme which was discussed above. We
cannot determine precisely definite cognitive times corresponding to these
scales. The scales are defined by ranges of frequencies and hence ranges of
scaling times.
For the alpha waves we choose its upper limit frequency, 12 Hz, and hence
the tc,α ≈ 0.083 sec. For the beta waves we consider (by taking upper bounds
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of frequency ranges) three different time scales: 15 Hz, tc,β,low ≈ 0.067 sec. –
low beta waves, 18Hz, tc,β ≈ 0.056 sec. – beta waves, 23 Hz tc,β,high ≈ 0.043
sec. – high beta waves. For gamma waves we take the characteristic frequency
40 Hz and hence the time scale tc,γ ≈ 0.025 sec.
The gamma scale is the finest and hence processes represented at this scale
has the highest degree of QL-ness. On the other hand, we know that gamma
waves patterns in the brain are associated with perception and consciousness.
The beta scale is coarser than the gamma scale and it has less degree of QL-
ness in processing of information. We know that beta states are associated
with normal waking of consciousness.
The theta waves are even less QL than the alpha waves. They are com-
monly found to originate from occipital lobe during periods of relaxation,
with eyes closed but still awake. They are involved into a representation
of information with a high degree of classicality. And these rhythms are
observed during some sleep states, and in states of quiet focus, for exam-
ple, meditation, Aftanas and Golosheykin (2005). However, there are also
experimental evidences that the theta rhythms are very strong in rodent hip-
pocampi and entorhinal cortex during learning and memory retrieval. We
can just speculate that learning needs using of an essentially more detailed
information representation. Thus learning (or at least a part of it) is less
QL and hence more CL. The same we can say about memory retrieval. It
also needs a more complete, CL-representation of information. Large body
of evidence, Buzsaki (2005), indicates that theta-rhythms are used in spatial
learning and navigation. Here we present the same reasons: such tasks are
based on the CL-representation of information.
Finally, we consider delta waves. Comparing with the highest scale – the
gamma scale, the delta time scale is extremely rough. This induces a low
degree of QL-ness. This is the state of deep sleep.16
Although we still did not come to the difficult problem, namely, deter-
mination of the subcognitive time scale, we can, nevertheless, compare the
degree of QL-ness of various time scales.
Our choice of the subcognitive time scale will be motivated by so called
Taxonomic Quantum Model, see Geissler et al (1978), Geissler and Puffe
(1982), Geissler (1983, 85, 87,92), Geissler and Kompass (1999, 2001), Geissler,
Schebera, and Kompass (1999), for the representation of cognitive processes
16The phenomena of sleep and dreaming are extremely complicated. We do not plan to
study them in this paper.
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in the brain (which was developed on the basis of the huge experimental re-
search on time-mind relation, see also Klix and van der Meer (1978), Kristof-
ferson (1972, 80, 90), Bredenkamp (1993), Teghtsoonian (1971). In the fol-
lowing section we recall briefly the main features of this model.
8 Taxonomic quantum model
There could be presented a portion of good criticism against starting from
EEG bands. Indeed, this band structure is one of the few indications that
directly point to behaviorally relevant physiological properties. Physiologists
suggesting the definitions had a good intuition. However, that these defi-
nitions depend on behavioral information is shown by enormous individual
differences in the band structures that can be defined only on a behavioral
basis. To some degree this concerns also the general band structure. Because
of individual differences, alpha is often restricted to the common range which
is too short to be theoretically fully relevant. Definitions often go only from
9 to 12 Hz. Most careful investigators (earliest Livanov) defined the band by
the range 7.5 to 13.5 Hz.
Therefore we propose to start with Taxonomic Quantum Model (TQM),
Geissler et al (1978), Geissler and Puffe (1982), Geissler (1983, 85, 87,92),
Geissler and Kompass (1999, 2001), Geissler, Schebera, and Kompass (1999).
Why do we propose to use TQM for start of theory instead of, say, some char-
acteristic physiological parameters such as neuronal refractoriness, transmis-
sion times, coupling strength etc.? In my view, the reason is that the only
basis for interpreting physiological facts of brain processes are psychophysical
(behavioral) observations, either based on motor reactions of conscious beings
or verbal reports on conscious events. This was the main way of thinking of
von Bekesy (1936). Of course, many of the functional statements of physi-
ologists have the same basis. For our purpose, this statement is absolutely
essential, because a coherent account of temporal properties of brain activity
must not only be related to behavioral observations, but it must be based
on temporal invariants extracted by a coherent theoretical account of behav-
ioral observations, and only these can provide the guideline to find the proper
physiological correspondences.
The best short cut to the approach is through the history of its emer-
gence: The first impulse towards a taxonomic turn arose in the early 1970s
from the discontent of Geissler, see, e.g., Geissler et al (1978), with the fact
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that in simple psychophysical tasks data could indistinguishably be fitted
to models resorting to widely differing, often enough even contradicting, as-
sumptions. In his research in visual recognition, to circumvent this difficulty,
Geissler introduced a technique of chronometric cross-task comparison. The
main idea was to disambiguate models by temporal parametrization, thereby
postulating invariance of time parameters under variation of stimulus param-
eters and task constraints (see e.g. Geissler et al. (1978) and Geissler and
Puffe (1982)). At that time another research group at the same institute
did something similar by fitting latencies in standardized reasoning tasks to
predicted numbers of operations, e.g., Klix and van der Meer (1978). The
estimates from the two lines of studies yielded a surprising picture: There
seemed to exist small bands of operation times centering at around 55, 110
and 220 ms, thus exhibiting near-doubling relations. As a datum from the
literature which fitted into this regularity the asymptotic value of 36.5 ms
determined by Kristofferson (1972), see also Kristofferson (1980, 90), came
to mind which up to the first decimal is 1/3 of 110 ms. Taken together,
these four values suggested a system of magic numbers. Herein a period of
110 ms represents something like a prototype duration from which the rest
of periods derives by either integer division or multiplication. From various
fit procedures for step lengths, Buffart and Geissler came up with an largest
common denominator (l.c.d.) of 9.13 ms (see Geissler, 1985) showing a stan-
dard deviation of 0.86 ms across individuals. It turned out that the four
above-mentioned periods, although partly many times larger than this small
period, can be represented as integer multiples of it, with nearly absolute pre-
cision: 4× 9.13 = 36.5; 6× 9.13 = 54.8; 12× 9.13 = 109.6; 24× 9.13 = 219.1.
Of course, this might have been some strange coincidence. Yet, later, chrono-
metric analysis seemed to support a modular unit of some 9 ms (see Geissler
(1985); Puffe (1990); Bredenkamp (1993). Further investigations justify a
modified assumption about quantal graining:
Regression yields the largest common denominator (l.c.d.) 4.6 ms, which
is nearly exactly one half of 9.13 ms.
Note that, in terms of hypothetical quanta, a period of such duration
represents the next smaller candidate of a true elementary time quantum
which is compatible with the recognition data. In the following, let us adopt
provisionally the (ideal) value of
Q0 = 4.565ms
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for this time quantum hypothesis.
The solution TQM offers to these seeming contradictions, see Geissler
(1987, 92, 85) can be considered as a generalization or at least an analogue
of the psychophysical principle of relative-range constancy. According to
Teghtsoonian (1971), this principle expresses itself in the fact that for all
sensory continua, in terms of output magnitudes, the ratio of the largest to
the smallest quantity is a constant of around 30. About the same value is
obtained from the so-called Subjective Weber Law.
The generalization of the principle in the realm of quantal timing is the
quantal-range constraint. To see how this analogue reads, consider first the
assumed smallest period Q0. For integer multiples n× Q0, consistency with
the relative range constraint implies n ≤ M, with M being a constant of
the hypothetical value 30. It follows that periods of durations in excess
of 30 × Q0 ≈ 137 ms cannot be represented within this smallest possible
range. To account for such periods, we have to assume larger ranges with
correspondingly larger admissible smallest quantal periods to be operative.
To retain consistency with the time quantum assumption, these periods must
be integer multiples of Q0 or, formally,
Qq = q ×Q0 (6)
with integer q must hold. Thus, in general, the maximum extension of any
quantal of periods Ti belonging to it is given by q × Q0 ≤ Ti ≤ M × q ×
Q0. Note that the lower bound q × Q0 also defines the smallest possible
distance between admissible periods within a range. For this reason we will
speak of it as the quantal resolution within a given range. Of course, in
the actual development, this abstract definition resulted from a variety of
empirical relationships suggesting a range ordering of quantal periods with
upper bounds maximally at 30 times the value of quantal resolution.
TQM does not exclude the possibility that there can be found smaller
characteristic time scales, e.g., Q0/30.
9 On the choice of subcognitive time scale
We choose Q0 as the unit of the subcognitive time:
spcogn = Q0 = 4.6ms (7)
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This corresponds to frequencies ≈ 220 Hz. Under such an assumption about
the subcognitive scale we can find the measure of QL-ness for different EEG
bands. For the alpha scale, we have
κα =
Q0
tc,α
≈ 0.055.
For the beta scales, we have:
κc,β,low =
Q0
tc,β,low
≈ 0.069; κc,β =
Q0
tc,β
≈ 0.082; κc,β,high =
Q0
tc,β,high
≈ 0.107.
For the gamma scale we have:
κγ =
Q0
tc,γ
≈ 1.84.
Thus QL-ness of processing of information increases. “Thinking through the
alpha waves” is more likely processing of information by ordinary computer.
Not so much information is neglected. Therefore the information processing
is not so tricky: there is no need to manipulate with extremely incomplete
information in the consistent way. “Thinking through the gamma waves” is
similar to processing of information by an analogue of quantum computer
– QL-computer, see Khrennikov (2006a). Such an information processing
is very tricky: permanent informational cuts, but in the consistent QL-way.
Finally, we come to the theta and delta scales. For the theta scale tc,θ = 0.125
sec. Thus
κθ =
Q0
tc,θ
≈ 0.037.
And for the delta scale tc,δ = 0.5 sec and hence:
κδ =
Q0
tc,δ
≈ 0.009.
Here the difference between the biological QL-processing of information in
the brain and the CL-processing (as in models of artificial intelligence) is
practically negligible.
We now compare our QL-scales of time with the ”quantum scales” which
were chosen in Khrennikov (2006d):
spcogn ≈ 10
−3 sec, spq ≈ 10
−44 sec. (8)
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tcogn = 30Q0 ≈ 10
−1 sec, tq ≈ 10
−21 sec. (9)
Thus our model is based on macroscopic time scales, in the opposition to
really quantum reductionist models.
If we follow TQM in more detail then we should consider a possibility
that in the brain there exist a hierarchy of subcognitive times, i.e., the above
model with one fixed subcognitive time given by (7) was oversimplified. From
the point of view of TQM each Qq given by (6) could serve as the basis of
a subcognitive time scale. We obtain a picture of extremely complex QL-
processing of information in the brain which is based of the huge multiplicity
of various subcognitive/cognitive scales.
In this framework the notion “subcognitive” loses its absolute mean-
ing. The notions “subcognitive”/“cognitive” become relative with respect
to a concrete psychological function (cognitive task). Moreover, a time scale
which is subcognitive for one psychological function can be at the same time
cognitive for another.
But the crucial point is that the same cognitive time scale, say tcogn, can
have a number of different subcognitive scales:
Qq1 ≤ ... ≤ Qqm.
Each pair of scales
(Qq1, tcogn), ..., (Qqm , tcogn)
induces its own QL-representation of information. Therefore the same tcogn-
rhythm can be involved in the performance of a few different psychological
functions.
The final message from TQM is that the cognitive time tcogn scale should
be based on an integer multiplier of the time quant Q0 :
tcogn = NQ0. (10)
In such a model we can totally escape coupling with directly defined different
EEG bands, alpha, beta, gamma,... We shall use only behaviorally defined
time scales. The Weber law gives us the restriction to the value of the
multiplier: N ≤ 30.
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